American conservatism vs. European liberalism
A couple days ago I stumbled onto an article from the Claremont Institute, a conservative think tank. Unlike many other consevative sites, Claremont is usually pretty solid in its analysis, even if I disagree with it. This article, though, both amused and enraged me. The author, Gerard Alexander, is a professor of politics at the University of Virginia.
It begins, like so much conservative "analysis," with a generalization unsupported by evidence, namely that
I like that adjective, "Reaganite." What better way to claim the high ground than by hitching your wagon to ideals that almost everyone supports and then claiming that your guys came up with it? So incentives, individualism, and responsibility didn't exist before Reagan? Silly me, here I thought all along that these were the hallmarks of liberal democracy.
But still, American conservatives are so lonely. How tragic.
Alexander begins by analyzing economic policy, namely the difference between the American belief in markets and the European belief in state involvement. He notes, for exampel that "most Western Europeans fear that markets will fail to meet their needs and satisfy their interests." Do most Western Europeans indeed think this? No support is given for this assertion. And if they think this, are they wrong? The presumption on Alexander's part is that they are, and to demonstrate the debilitating influence of government policies on economic performance, he claims that
But do most Swedes consider themselves poor? Sweden has one of the highest standards of living in the world, and its population is certainly better served by the welfare state than the poor of the states mentioned by Alexander. Moreover, economic inequality in Sweden is lower, which reveals the folly of using per-capita income to evaluate how rich or poor Swedes are relative to West Virginians. A more detailed analysis of the comparison between Sweden and the U.S. can be found here; Alexander leaves out the complications of this analysis.
The foreign policy comparison comes next. See, according to Alexander (and who else?) American conservatives believe that "although international conflicts may arise from uncertainty, misunderstanding, and mutual threats, they usually result from simple predation, power-hunger, and hatred." Of course, Alexander doesn't bother trying to show whethre his assertion of American conservatives' beliefs, or those beliefs themselves have any resemblance to the truth. Now Europeans, says Alexander, "Instead ... insist on seeing misperception, insecurity, and pride as the root of most international conflicts, which accordingly are best defused by reassurance and the careful avoidance of confrontation, ultimatums, and threats."
Again, is this true? Do Europeans really see the world this way? There is no evidence in support of this assertion. Of course, both ways of approaching the problem are limited; a combination of the two is what's really in order, with the balance sometimes falling on one side, sometimes on the other. But Alexander's article gives no indication of the possibility of compromise between these two world views.
Alexander also makes profitable use of the mythical hard-soft distinction that supposedly exists in American politics and between America and Europe. See, Democrats are the "mommy" party and Republicans are the "daddy" party; the obvious implication being, of course, that the "daddy" party, which supposedly "tries to toughen citizens to cope with life's ordeals" is the superior one. That the "mommy" part is just full of effete coddlers is the unstated but implied subtext of Alexander's analysis. Never mind that business in the Constitution's preamble about promoting the general welfare. Those founder guys didn't really mean that.
The evil specter of secularism loomes large in Alexander's article, and although he does not link it directly to his previous points, the linkage is again implied. First point out the features of European states you find undesirable and then mention, in passing, how awfully secular Europeans are. Better yet, invert the exceptionalism equation to show that Europeans are abnormally secular and imply that this is a negative rather than a positiv thing (something that would never fly where American exceptionalism is concerned.)
Inevitably, as it apparently must in every conservative critique, the elites are next to come under attack. That's right, public expression is "monopolized by a collusive journalistic, intellectual, and Eurocratic elite," according to that sage and epitome of integrity William Kristol. Again, no evidence is provided for this alleged monopoly; in any case, the underlying assumption is that the elites are necessarily the bad guys. No attempt is made to examine the content of the critique of those elites. Of course, according to Kristol, salvation can only come from a European Newt Gingrich.
Alexander concludes his article with the suggestion that American conservatives evangelize their free-market principles to Europe (although he bemoans the unlikelyhood of a "values revival"). He finally suggests that American liberals have more in common with American conservatives than with liberals abroad, since by international standards Democrats are not particularly leftist. But no rational comparison of what American conservatives stand for today (a demand that a particular religion be endorsed by the state, the elimination of regulations for favored industries, the subjection of individual rights to the demands of the majority) with the tenets of liberalism (whether classical or modern) could possibly lead anyone to make that claim seriously.
A couple days ago I stumbled onto an article from the Claremont Institute, a conservative think tank. Unlike many other consevative sites, Claremont is usually pretty solid in its analysis, even if I disagree with it. This article, though, both amused and enraged me. The author, Gerard Alexander, is a professor of politics at the University of Virginia.
It begins, like so much conservative "analysis," with a generalization unsupported by evidence, namely that
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, country after country abandoned socialism for free markets, embracing such Reaganite themes as incentives, individualism, and responsibility.
I like that adjective, "Reaganite." What better way to claim the high ground than by hitching your wagon to ideals that almost everyone supports and then claiming that your guys came up with it? So incentives, individualism, and responsibility didn't exist before Reagan? Silly me, here I thought all along that these were the hallmarks of liberal democracy.
But still, American conservatives are so lonely. How tragic.
Alexander begins by analyzing economic policy, namely the difference between the American belief in markets and the European belief in state involvement. He notes, for exampel that "most Western Europeans fear that markets will fail to meet their needs and satisfy their interests." Do most Western Europeans indeed think this? No support is given for this assertion. And if they think this, are they wrong? The presumption on Alexander's part is that they are, and to demonstrate the debilitating influence of government policies on economic performance, he claims that
A recent study by two Swedish economists found that if the United Kingdom, France, or Italy suddenly were admitted to the American union, any one of them would rank as the 5th poorest of the 50 states, ahead only of West Virginia, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Montana. Ireland, the second richest E.U. country, would be the 13th poorest state; Sweden the 6th poorest. The study found that 40% of all Swedish households would classify as low-income by American standards.
But do most Swedes consider themselves poor? Sweden has one of the highest standards of living in the world, and its population is certainly better served by the welfare state than the poor of the states mentioned by Alexander. Moreover, economic inequality in Sweden is lower, which reveals the folly of using per-capita income to evaluate how rich or poor Swedes are relative to West Virginians. A more detailed analysis of the comparison between Sweden and the U.S. can be found here; Alexander leaves out the complications of this analysis.
The foreign policy comparison comes next. See, according to Alexander (and who else?) American conservatives believe that "although international conflicts may arise from uncertainty, misunderstanding, and mutual threats, they usually result from simple predation, power-hunger, and hatred." Of course, Alexander doesn't bother trying to show whethre his assertion of American conservatives' beliefs, or those beliefs themselves have any resemblance to the truth. Now Europeans, says Alexander, "Instead ... insist on seeing misperception, insecurity, and pride as the root of most international conflicts, which accordingly are best defused by reassurance and the careful avoidance of confrontation, ultimatums, and threats."
Again, is this true? Do Europeans really see the world this way? There is no evidence in support of this assertion. Of course, both ways of approaching the problem are limited; a combination of the two is what's really in order, with the balance sometimes falling on one side, sometimes on the other. But Alexander's article gives no indication of the possibility of compromise between these two world views.
Alexander also makes profitable use of the mythical hard-soft distinction that supposedly exists in American politics and between America and Europe. See, Democrats are the "mommy" party and Republicans are the "daddy" party; the obvious implication being, of course, that the "daddy" party, which supposedly "tries to toughen citizens to cope with life's ordeals" is the superior one. That the "mommy" part is just full of effete coddlers is the unstated but implied subtext of Alexander's analysis. Never mind that business in the Constitution's preamble about promoting the general welfare. Those founder guys didn't really mean that.
The evil specter of secularism loomes large in Alexander's article, and although he does not link it directly to his previous points, the linkage is again implied. First point out the features of European states you find undesirable and then mention, in passing, how awfully secular Europeans are. Better yet, invert the exceptionalism equation to show that Europeans are abnormally secular and imply that this is a negative rather than a positiv thing (something that would never fly where American exceptionalism is concerned.)
Inevitably, as it apparently must in every conservative critique, the elites are next to come under attack. That's right, public expression is "monopolized by a collusive journalistic, intellectual, and Eurocratic elite," according to that sage and epitome of integrity William Kristol. Again, no evidence is provided for this alleged monopoly; in any case, the underlying assumption is that the elites are necessarily the bad guys. No attempt is made to examine the content of the critique of those elites. Of course, according to Kristol, salvation can only come from a European Newt Gingrich.
Alexander concludes his article with the suggestion that American conservatives evangelize their free-market principles to Europe (although he bemoans the unlikelyhood of a "values revival"). He finally suggests that American liberals have more in common with American conservatives than with liberals abroad, since by international standards Democrats are not particularly leftist. But no rational comparison of what American conservatives stand for today (a demand that a particular religion be endorsed by the state, the elimination of regulations for favored industries, the subjection of individual rights to the demands of the majority) with the tenets of liberalism (whether classical or modern) could possibly lead anyone to make that claim seriously.
